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THE SUBMISSION OF ISSUES IN NEGLIGENCE
CASES
LEON GREEN*
The submission of a case to a jury is the most difficult step in
negligence litigation and also the most treacherous. A case having reached
the stage for decision, the trial judge must submit to the jury for its
determination all the contested issues of fact that remain doubtful. All
uncontested facts, all agreed facts, all issues of fact that fall by the way
for lack of evidence to sustain them or that are so fully sustained that no
issue remains, require no submission. But what is an issue of fact? Here
is the rub, for "fact" is a highly variable concept that will not submit to
stable definition but takes its meaning from its context.' It is generally
said that only ultimate or controlling issues of fact should be submitted.
Ultimate issues imply conclusions reached after consideration of extensive
factual detail offered in evidence by the litigants. Moreover, ultimate
issues in most instances require conclusions reached in the light of in-
structions on the law as given by the court. Thus, the determination of
ultimate issues is based on both facts and law. Ultimate issues are for
jury determination only when the evidentiary facts are in dispute, or
when the inferences to be drawn from them will support different conclu-
sions. When the evidentiary facts are undisputed and only one reasonable
inference can be supported by them, the ultimate issue is one of law for
the judge.
In order to submit the ultimate issues in litigation, the trial judge
must be able to assess the claims and defenses made by the litigants in
the pleadings and to evaluate the evidence in their support, and must
then instruct on the law pertinent to their determination. Inasmuch as
it cannot be known what claims and defenses and what evidence in their
support will be accepted by the jury, the judge usually instructs hypo-
thetically, stating the law applicable to the different conclusions the jury
may reach on the facts. After consideration of the evidence covering the
whole case and the judge's instructions, the jury responds with a verdict
for the plaintiff or the defendant. This is the orthodox method of submis-
sion by general charge calling for a general verdict.'
The general charge, in addition to various cautionary instructions,8
may consist of numerous lengthy and involved instructions on the law
subject to many objections and exceptions made by the litigants, and
frequently supplemented by a multitude of special instructions requested
* Professor, University of Texas Law School.
1. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL ch. III (1949); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY ch. 9 (1930).
2. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 250 (1920).
3. See RANDALL, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES ch. 30 (1922); REID, BRANSON'S INSTRUCTIONS
TO JURIES (3d ed. 1960).
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by opposing advocates which may be given or refused and made the basis
of exception by one party if given and by the other if refused. Some
jurisdictions also permit special interrogatories on important factual de-
tails to be given at the instance of the parties, usually the defendant, in
order to test the jury's general verdict, and if a special interrogatory is
answered inconsistently with the general verdict, the latter must fall and
judgment will be rendered in favor of the party in whose favor the in-
terrogatory is answered, or a new trial will be granted.4 Several jurisdic-
tions employ a method of submission by special issues-a modification of
the common-law special verdict. Where well administered this device is
an improvement over the general charge and general verdict, but where
not well administered it is abortive of jury trial.'
The general charge and general verdict, together with the numerous
variations found in the American states, have a long and weird develop-
ment.' From the single issue of early English practice with oral
instructions by the judge, together with his comments on the weight that
should be given certain aspects of the evidence thought to be significant,
the submission of a negligence case in more recent years may involve any
number of claims and defenses, several parties plaintiff and defendant,
different issues as between the several parties, and complex written in-
structions which in many jurisdictions must avoid comment or over-em-
phasis on any phase of the evidence.7 There has never been any wide
agreement on what constitutes a satisfactory submission method, and
4. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J.
588 (1923); FED. R. Civ. P. 49; Tugwell v. A. F. Klaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1963) ; Hopper v. Reed, 320 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1963).
5. Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J. 715 (1927); GREEN, JUDGE
AND JuRY ch. 13 (1930). Since this study was published many refinements have been made
in the use of the special issue method of submission, and in most instances hurtfully. In
addition to North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin, Ohio now employs the special issue method.
Onio REV. CODE § 2315.15 (1963). The fragmentation of the issues into numerous questions
has greatly impaired the practice. See Green, The Submission of Special Verdicts in Negli-
gence Cases-A Critique of the Bug Bite Case, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469 (1963) for a
critique of Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 83 Sup. Ct. 659 (1963), indicating extreme
abuse of the method by the Ohio court. For Texas practice see Green, Special Issues, 14
TEXAS B.J. 521 (1951). How extravagant the Texas practice has become is reflected by
HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS (1959); THODE, PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION
IN TEXAS, ch. 12 (1961). The method is still further perverted by the attempt to use it to
prevent the jury from knowing the significance of their answers to the issues. The very
heart of jury trial is the doing of justice as between the parties by the shaping of their
verdict accordingly. See Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 274 (1955), and
authorities cited. This tendency to keep the jury in the dark is reflected in McCourtie v.
United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552 (1958), noted in 43 MINN. L. REv.
823 (1959).
6. See an excellent group of articles by Curtis Wright, Jr., Adequacy of Instructions to
Jury, 53 MICH. L. REV. 505, 813 (1955); Instructions to the Jury: Summary Without
Comment, WASH. U.L.Q. 177 (1954); The Invasion of the Jury: Temperature of the War,
27 TEMP. L.Q. 137 (1953). See also REID, BRANSON'S INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (3d ed. 1960).
7. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194
(1942); Maxwell, The Problem of Jury Instructions, 43 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1936); Savage,
Model Instructions in a Civil Case to a Petit Jury, 21 OxLA. B.A.J. 1281 (1950).
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every method which has been attempted has been subjected to severe
criticism, modification, and refinement.8
Why should the submission process be so difficult-and why not
remove some of the difficulties? The considerations are numerous: 9
FIRST. There is frequently no general acceptance of what the issues
are in a litigated negligence case, and their identification, isolation and
formulation in the particular case are frequently in hot dispute.
SECOND. Tort law is constantly in flux. Theories of liability undergo
modification, methods of making proof are extended and refined and
different procedures from case to case are not uniform.
THIRD. The trial judge is usually put under great pressure by the
litigants to present to the jury every phase of the factual data favorable
to their contentions. To this end attorneys invoke numerous rules of law
which have grown up to avoid the "no comment on the evidence" re-
straint, including special instructions on presumptions of various dimen-
sions, and other refinements, for example, unavoidable accident, sudden
emergency, imminent peril and sole proximate cause.
FOURTH. The litigants, especially defendants, have a vested interest
in the multiplication of issues and instructions in order to divert the
jury's attention from the basic issues of a case, and to create a "fall out"
of error for purposes of appellate review.
FIFTH. The appellate courts find in the instructions the chief means
of control of trial judge and jury,"0 the just disposition of the particular
case and the basis for the development of the law through the writing of
judicial opinions.
SIXTH. Changes on a large scale in local procedures are extremely
difficult to make and they usually come only after an extended campaign
spearheaded by some powerful member of the highest state court, for
example, Chief Justices Vanderbilt of New Jersey and Alexander of
Texas, with the support of leading members of the bar.
This list of difficulties that would be encountered in developing a
satisfactory method of submission falls short of describing the magnitude
of the problem, as will be recognized by everyone conversant with the
litigation of negligence cases. The practitioners of negligence law are
divided into powerful and professionally hostile camps neither of which
would be likely to support any serious changes in current methods of the
submission process. Moreover, the appellate courts which have the power
and responsibility for developing and sustaining a rational process of
submission, are manned by judges of too many minds, who for the most
8. See materials cited in note 6 supra.
9. Wiehl, Instructing a Jury in Washington, 36 WASH. L. REV. 378 (1961).
10. Farley, supra note 7; GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY ch. 14 (1930).
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part are too timid or are unwilling to undergo the extended study, trials
and tribulations of such an undertaking.
Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to suggest a type of a submission
that might eventually merit acceptance by some jurisdiction anxious to
be freed of the woes and waste of its current practice:
FORMULATION OF ISSUES
It is believed that a clear statement of the issues involved in a liti-
gated case is the prime essential of an acceptable submission process.
Most of the decisions in negligence cases about which doubts are expressed
are those in which the issues either were not identified or were erroneously
formulated. The basic issues of any negligence case are those that the
plaintiff must sustain on the facts and on the law. Incident to the basic
issues there may be any number of subordinate issues or qualifications
which add to the plaintiff's burden. The defensive issues are directed at
one or more of the issues which must be sustained by the plaintiff, though
some defensive issues may be directed at the whole case as, for ex-
ample, a plea of limitations or the interposition of some immunity from
liability. There are several issues basic to every negligence case, though
it is rare for all to be hotly contested in the same case."
CAUSAL RELATION
The first basic issue of any negligence issue is the identification of
the defendant as a person whose conduct contributed to the injury the
plaintiff claims to have sustained; this is the causal relation issue. The
plaintiff must offer proof that he, or the victim in whose behalf he sues,' 2
suffered injury and that it resulted from the defendant's conduct. With
reference to submitting the issue, the trial judge's function is to determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to raise the issue and then to state it in
proper form for jury consideration.
In many cases there is no contest of the causal relation issue, or the
evidentiary facts are so conclusive that the court should affirmatively
instruct the jury that there is no issue and it must accept the fact that the
plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the defendant's conduct. Likewise,
in some cases there is no sufficient evidence linking the plaintiff's injury
to the conduct of the defendant and the case should be dismissed or an
instructed or directed verdict given for the defendant. In some cases
there will be doubt that the plaintiff has suffered injury, or if he has,
there will be doubt that his injury was contributed to by the defendant's
11. Tullgren v. Omoskeag Mfg. Co., 92 N.H. 268, 133 At. 4 (1926), is one of the few
cases that presents a full-dress consideration of the basic issues in a negligence case.
12. For the purposes of this study "plaintiff" is used to indicate the person who insti-
tutes the suit as well as the victim who suffered the injury, though in many instances the
plaintiff is not the victim.
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conduct. In other words, the plaintiff may be malingering, or his injury
may be the result of the conduct of others, or of the plaintiff himself. If
there is evidence that the plaintiff's injury was contributed to by the
defendant's conduct, the issue is submissible although the injury was
also contributed to by other persons, the plaintiff himself, or 'some natural
phenomena for which no one is responsible. In rare cases the burden may
be imposed upon the defendant to show what his conduct was with re-
spect to the plaintiff's injury and that he did not contribute to it.'" This
is especially true in cases of personal injury in which the plaintiff is in no
position to know what happened and the defendant is in a position to
know what happened. There is no test by which the judge can measure
whether the proof rises to a level requiring the issue to be submitted
except that of his trained and experienced judgment. The test usually
stated is whether the evidence will support two reasonable opposing
inferences, but this does nothing more than state the problem.
The issue should be stated simply: did the defendant by his conduct
(for example, in the operation of his car) contribute substantially to the
plaintiff's injury? This would seem to be as simple a fact question as can
be asked a jury. Immediatly, however, the court will be requested to
instruct the jury what is meant by "substantially"; how much is "sub-
stantially"? Obviously the term cannot be broken down into terms of
more definite meaning and any synonym, such as "materially" or "ap-
preciably," would meet with the same request. The term had best be left
for any clarification that can be given it by the arguments of the advocates
and the jury's good judgment. The issue may be doubtful indeed, in some
cases supported wholly by circumstantial evidence, or by expert testimony
sharply contradicted by the opinions of other experts. 4
As simple as it is, the submission of the issue should be followed by
13. Summers v. Tice, 32 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949); Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co., 173 N.E.2d 822
(Ill. Ct. App. 1961).
14. Rudick v. Princeville Memorial Hosp., 319 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963); Evans v. United
States, 319 F.2d 751 (1st Cir. 1963); Nordmeyer v. Sanzone, 314 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1963);
McDougle v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 312 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1963); Meehan v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 312 F.2d 737 (3rd Cir. 1963); Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291
(5th Cir. 1962); Gipson v. Memphis St. Ry., 364 S.W.2d 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); Walton
v. Guthrie, 362 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); Helman v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 381 P.2d
605 (Wash. 1963). It is interesting to note that many cases confuse the causal relation and
negligence issues and talk about causation when the only issue is one of negligence. See
Great No. Ry. v. Ross, 315 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Jeffery v. Gordon, 365 S.W.2d 128 (Ark.
1963); McCauley v. Lasher, 368 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). In a few cases there is
no doubt about causal relation one way or the other. Products, Inc. v. Eazor Express, Inc.,
318 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1963); Athens Canning Co. v. Ballard, 365 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963). In Hartsock v. Forsgren, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 117 (Ark. 1963), there was no issue of causal
relation, but a problem of whether the risk of injury was within the scope of defendant's
duty. The court treated the issue as one of negligence for the court's determination-and
reached a highly doubtful conclusion. The factual data may be so skimpy that causal relation,
duty, sufficiency of the evidence on the negligence issue and negligence are all doubtful.
Croisant v. Horner, 378 P.2d 760 (Okla. 1963).
[VOL. XVIII
SUBMISSION OF ISSUES
explanatory instructions. The jury may be told that the fact that other
persons may also have contributed to the plaintiff's injury is of no im-
portance other than the light such fact may throw upon defendant's
conduct as a substantial factor in contributing to the injury. The fact
alone that the plaintiff suffered injury is no basis for attributing it to the
defendant's conduct. Nor is the fact alone that the defendant's conduct
was calculated to do injury to some one enough to link his conduct to the
plaintiff's injury. The jury may be cautioned that the inquiry is not how
much injury the plaintiff suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct,
nor whether a pre-existing injury of the plaintiff was merely aggravated,
as those considerations are pertinent to other issues. The issue and the
explanatory instructions should allow full consideration of all the evi-
dence and pertinent arguments of the advocates. Aside from the statement
of the issue, there may be little uniformity in submissions of the issue
from case to case inasmuch as the explanatory instructions should vary
to accommodate the factual data in evidence and the type of case. The
chief requisites are that the explanatory instructions should be as brief
and as clear as possible. The appellate courts should be satisfied with
approximate perfection.
It will be noted that the use of 'such terms as proximate, remote, sole,
intervening, superseding and other "cause" terminology has been studi-
ously avoided. This has been done in order to escape the limitless confu-
sion that is found throughout legal literature in the use of cause con-
cepts.' 5 There may be and usually are many "causes" of an injury, but
the only inquiry before the court and jury is whether the defendant's
conduct contributed substantially to the injury. The term "cause" is too
ambiguous, too indefinable, too incomprehensible, too treacherous and
points in too many directions to focus attention on the defendant's con-
duct as the only "cause" in litigation. Despite what seems to be the gen-
eral understanding of the profession, causation terms are not always
employed in the sense of causal relation or connection between conduct
and injury. They are more frequently used in the sense of liability, wrong-
doing and fault.'" The causal relation issue is satisfied by a finding that
the defendant's conduct contributed substantially to the plaintiff's in-
jury. Whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, even though he did
15. See PROSSER, TORTS ch. 9 (2d ed. 1955) and citation of authorities; 2 HARPER &
JAMSS, TORTS ch. 20 (1956) and authorities listed; HART & HONORE, CAUSATION r TE LAW
(1959); GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Green, The Causal Relation Issue
in Negligence Law, 60 MIcE. L. REV. 543 (1962).
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 430-62 (1934), "The Causal Relation Necessary to Responsi-
bility for Negligence," deals elaborately with legal cause and many other causes which are
concerned with wrongdoing as opposed to cause-in-fact or causal relation although each term
used has almost 100% ambiguity. Some eminent authorities are inclined to reduce the whole
of negligence law to doctrines of causation. See HART & HONORE, op. cit. supra note 15;
R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW Op TORTS (1963); Kendrick v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
265 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1959) (concurring "causes" used in sense of causal relation and
wrongdoing).
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contribute to his injury, and for how much, are distinct basic issues yet
to be considered.
DUTY
The second basic issue in a negligence case is whether the plaintiff
has any law on which to rest his case. Did the defendant owe the plaintiff
any duty under the law with respect to the injury suffered by the plaintiff?
Duty is never a matter for the jury, and when a court submits the finding
of a duty to the jury the error is due to a failure to identify and formulate
the issues in the case. The plaintiff must base his case upon some duty
owed the plaintiff incident to the affirmative conduct of the defendant
and this must be made known to the jury. Inasmuch as the facts may be
in dispute or subject to a diversity of interpretations the court's instruc-
tions will normally be hypothetical, i.e., conditioned on the particular
findings of fact made by the jury. In negligence cases the defendant's
duty is usually expressed as a duty "to exercise care." But this is only the
root; the duty must be specific, the duty to use care in doing whatever
the defendant was engaged upon." Whether the conduct of the defendant
imposed a duty upon him with respect to the risk of injury suffered by
the plaintiff is a problem the court must determine at least provisionally
before the fact issues are submitted to the jury, but its ultimate determi-
nation may be deferred until after the verdict is returned by the jury. 8
The most troublesome phase of the duty problem is the determina-
tion of its coverage-what risks are included within its scope-how far
does it reach-what protection does the law extend to the plaintiff against
the risk of injury suffered by the plaintiff? It is the problem of the ex-
tent of liability which can only be determined after all the facts are made
known.'" It is rare indeed that the law will impose liability for all the
consequences of the injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a de-
fendant's wrongful conduct. There are no mechanical or other rules that
define the precise boundaries of a defendant's duty in the particular case.
17. Affirmative conduct as the keystone of tort law is frequently overlooked and the
issues of causal relation, duty and violation of duty are frequently sought to be based on
some "omission" or failure to act. Omission or failure to act can never be the basis of
liability unless it is a detail in the performance or carrying out of some undertaking or
activity which imposes a duty on the defendant. It is the affirmative conduct that imposes the
duty, and it is the failure of that conduct to meet the standard set by the law that makes
the conduct negligent. It is only in this sense that an omission can be considered negligent.
For a fuller discussion see Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Cases, 60 MIcH.
L. REv. 543 (1962).
18. The absence of duty, fundamental as it is, may be raised by demurrer, motion to
dismiss, motion for directed verdict, motion for judgment n.o.v. and perhaps at other
stages of the trial. It may be raised even on appeal as fundamental error.
19. This statement assumes a well pleaded case and does not overlook the fact that the
pleadings may disclose some vital defense, e.g., the statute of limitations, some immunity, or
simply allegations of facts for which there is no law imposing a duty. The statement does
imply that duty is not determined by "foresight of harm" as sometimes insisted, but by the
"hindsight of the court" in determining whether the law's protection either does or should
reach the risk of injury suffered by the plaintiff and the consequences for which he seeks
recovery.
SUBMISSION OF ISSUES
Many courts attempt to define the boundaries of liability by rules of
causation-legal cause, proximate cause, remote cause, intervening cause,
superseding cause and a whole family of other related causes. Here cause
terminology is employed not in the sense of causal relation, but in the
sense of responsibility, fault wrongdoing, liability." Causation doctrines,
once factual causal relation is shown, give no assistance to anyone in mak-
ing a determination of the extent of liability that should be imposed on
a defendant. This function of the judge demands the profoundest con-
siderations of tort law, and reliance on rules of causation at this point,
if they are taken seriously, is a complete rejection of the responsibilities
of judging. Former decisions of the court based on causation doctrines
are frequently treacherous precedents. Every case arises out of a different
factual environment though it may be so nearly similar as to require the
same treatment as other cases. But new situations are constantly arising
which require some modification of the patterns set by former decisions.
This is the law making stage of the litigation process. The judge's best
reliance is found in his knowledge of the current state of the law, its
difficulties of administration, and the economic and other factors at work
in the social environment, plus a well developed sense of justice.2' The
determination of the defendant's duty and the risks of injury included
within its scope provide the essential basis for the determination of the
defendant's wrongdoing and also the items of injury for which the plain-
tiff may recover damages. Thus, the jury should be instructed as to the
specific duty owed by the defendant and its limitations in terms of the
risks imposed.
NEGLIGENCE
The third basic issue in a negligence action is the violation of duty
or the negligence issue. Assuming that the conduct of the defendant
contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the risk of which falls within the
scope of the defendant's duty, the plaintiff still has the burden of proving
that the defendant was a wrongdoer, i.e., that he violated his duty to the
plaintiff with respect to the injury suffered. This is the negligence issue,
the heart of the negligence action. On this issue it is the function of the
trial judge to determine whether the evidence raises the issue, and if so,
to submit it to the jury. These are both highly important functions. The
sufficiency of the evidence to raise the issue question may be exceedingly
difficult.22 Whether reasonable minds can draw different conclusions
from the evidence is the test here as it is on all fact issues, and it gives
as little aid to the judge in reaching his decision on this as on other issues.
20. See materials cited at note 16 supra.
21. This thesis is more fully developed in GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY, chs. 3 & 4 (1930).
22. Willard v. Hutson, 93 Ariz. 251, 378 P.2d 966 (1962); Powell v. Moore, 228 Ore.
255, 364 P.2d 1094 (1961). Ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence of negligence was at
one time the chief means of limiting liability in negligence cases. See HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 120-21 (1881). It is still widely used even by appellate courts. Calvert, "No Evidence"
and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 361 (1960).
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If the defendant's conduct rests on some common-law duty, the environ-
ment of the injury may constitute what is known as a res ipsa loquitur
situation, and that alone may be sufficient as a basis for submitting the
issue.28 Also, if some statute designed for the plaintiff's protection against
the risk of injury suffered is violated by the defendant, that too may
warrant the court in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury.24
How shall the issue be submitted? As is true of other issues, the
negligence issue should be stated simply and at the beginning of the
instructions on the issue. Perhaps it is best stated in the form of a
question: Was the defendant's conduct negligent (for example, in the
operation of his car) with respect to the plaintiff's injury? As an explana-
tory formula, the jury should be instructed that in order to find the
defendant's conduct negligent they must find that as an ordinarily prudent
person under all the circumstances surrounding his conduct, the defend-
ant should have reasonably foreseen as a result of his conduct, some such
injury as the plaintiff suffered, and they must find also that he failed to
exercise reasonable care to avoid the injury.
It will be noted that the formula indicating the measure or standard
of the defendant's conduct is two-pronged, the first prong based on the
foreseeability of harm, and the second based on the failure to exercise
reasonable care to avoid the harm. Both are required to constitute
negligent conduct. Some courts split the formula, submitting the first
prong as "proximate" or some other cause, and the second as negligence. 5
Thus, it is that causation doctrines are also interposed to resolve a highly
important phase of the negligence issue into terms that render endless
confusion for courts, jurors and advocates. It is an inexcusable practice
and frequently results in unjust decisions. It may be noted also that
appellate courts not infrequently pick up the false issue of causation at
23. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863). The function of this theory has
been greatly expanded as indicated by the extensive literature dealing with the doctrine.
James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L.
REv. 179 (1951); PROSSER, TORTS 199-217 (2d ed. 1955). See Heyduck v. Elder & Johnson
Co., 187 N.E.2d 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) for the modern counterpart of Byrne v. Boadle,
supra. See also notes 31 & 35 infra and accompanying text.
24. PROSSER, TORTS 161-64 (2d ed. 1955) ; James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in
Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95 (1950).
25. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Black, 152 Tex. 343, 257 S.W.2d 416 (1953); Seins-
heimer v. Burkhart, 132 Tex. 336, 122 S.W.2d 1063 (1939). The Texas courts are not alone in
this perversion of the submission formula. See Merlo v. Public Serv. Co., 381 Iln. 300, 45
N.E.2d 665 (1942); Stamas v. Fanning, 185 N.E.2d 751 (Mass. 1962); Dunbar v. American
Airlines, Inc., 376 P.2d 226 (Okla. 1962). Other courts reject foreseeability as a factor in
causation, proximate or otherwise. See Collier v. Citizens Coach Co., 231 Ark. 489, 330 S.W.2d
74 (1959) ; Railway Express v. Brabham, 62 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1952) ; Dixie Drive-It-Yourself
Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962); Elbert v. City of
Saginaw, 363 Mich. 463, 474, 109 N.W.2d 879, 884 (1961) (opinion of Smith, J.); Dellwo
v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961); Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d




this point and find no evidence or insufficient evidence to warrant its
submission although a jury has found the defendant negligent.26
A plaintiff may allege several grounds of negligence to sustain his
action and this adds complexity to the submission of the case. For ex-
ample, in a collision case the plaintiff may allege that defendant was
operating his car at excessive speed, with deficient brakes and inadequate
lights. Any one of these grounds if established may be sufficient to support
his case, but plaintiff offers evidence sufficient to require the court to
submit an issue as to each ground. It is suggested that the issue should be
submitted as follows: was defendant's conduct negligent with respect to
plaintiff's injury, (a) in operating his car at excessive speed? (b) in
operating his car with deficient brakes? (c) in operating his car with
inadequate lights? The issue would be followed by appropriate explana-
tory instructions, and each subdivision should be answered "yes" or "no."
In many jurisdictions each of these grounds if sustained by proof
would be in violation of a statute and thus, negligence per se, and the
defendant would be held negligent unless he established some legal
excuseY In other jurisdictions the violation of the statute would have
to be found negligent conduct as governed by the explanatory formula
set out above, with the burden of proof on the plaintiff.28 In most juris-
dictions a uniform weight is not given to the violation of all statutes.29
Wherever the local law deviates from the common law, the local law with
respect to the negligence issue would have to be taken into account in the
submission process. The point to be emphasized here, however, is that the
negligence issue would be sustained if any one ground were found favor-
able to the plaintiff as negligence per se or by verdict of the jury; yet
the defendant by virtue of the separation of the grounds would be in a
position to attack the finding if he thought the issue had been im-
providently submitted on a particular ground.
26. Superior Forwarding Co. v. Garner, 366 S.W.2d 290 (Ark. 1963); Hartsock v.
Forsgren, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 117 (Ark. 1963); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11
N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962); Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 358 S.W.2d 543
(Tex. 1962). In Klaveness & Co. v. Dewey, 379 P.2d 560 (Ore. 1963), the Oregon Supreme
Court gave extended consideration to the matter of eliminating proximate cause from
instructions given a jury on the negligence issue. The several opinions are extremely interest-
ing. The concurring opinion of Justice O'Connell is in general accord with some of the
suggestions made here, as is the concurring opinion of Justice Goodwin in Stoneburner v.
Greyhound Corp., 375 P.2d 812 (Ore. 1962).
27. Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); Butler v. Engel, 243 Minn.
317, 68 N.W.2d 226 (1954); McLain v. Ford, 115 Ohio 69, 184 N.E.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1961);
Nettleton v. James, 212 Ore. 375, 319 P.2d 879 (1958); Albers v. Ottenbacher, 116 N.W.2d
529 (S.D. 1962); 39 MINN. L. REV. 915 (1955).
28. Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry.
v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956). See Prosser's trenchant discussion of why
negligence law cannot be reduced to inflexible formulas. PROSSER, ToRTs 195-97 (2d ed. 1955).
29. Desmond, Effect of Violating a Statute, Ordinance or Administrative Regulation,
1954 Wis. L. REv. 116. See Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d
279 (1947).
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Another complication arises at this point because some courts hold
that the jury must find that the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. This would require the submission of the
proximate cause issue as to each ground of negligence found against the
defendant. With all respect to the courts so holding, this is foul practice.
It is foul practice in that if causal relation as discussed above has been
shown between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, that
issue has then been determined with finality. The causal relation issue
in the example given above only involves contribution to plaintiff's injury
by the operation of the car. Causal relation will exist whether the car is
operated with or without negligence. The specific details of how the
defendant operated the car are only relevant to show that his conduct
was negligent, and are immaterial on the issue of causal relation on
whatever ground defendant's conduct is found to be negligent.80 The only
basis on which there could be two or more issues of causal relation in the
same case would be the joinder of two or more separate and distinct
causes of action.
If submitted as suggested, the negligence issue is comprehensive and
an adequate basis for all further explanations that need be given a jury
for its understanding of what should be considered in reaching a verdict
on the issue. One of the more important situations that requires explana-
tion on this issue is known as res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself.
A res ipsa loquitur situation is a happening attributable to the defendant's
conduct and resulting in injury to the plaintiff, which without explanation
is a basis for inferring that the defendant's conduct was negligent.8 1
This doctrine is restricted to the negligence issue alone and our interest
here is its function in the submission of that issue.82 It is a troublesome
concept inasmuch as it is ill defined, given different weights by different
30. See note 17 supra.
31. In many respects res ipsa loquitur in the common-law area of negligence law runs
parallel with negligence per se in the statutory area, and is treated in much the same way
by the courts. In many cases in which one or the other doctrine is apparently employea, it is
not always clear if the court is not in fact, exercising its common-law power to determine
that under the facts the defendant is negligent, or the plaintiff contributorily negligent, as a
matter of law. Woyen v. Perkins, 60 Wash. 2d 789, 375 P.2d 742 (1962). The res ipsa
loquitur literature is massive. See Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 4 LA. L. REV. 70 (1941);
Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 257, 761 (1948) ; and the long list of
writings cited by James and Prosser in their discussions of the subject, op. cit. supra note 23.
See also the intensive study by McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation,
37 VA. L. REV. 55 (1951).
32. Some courts speak as if causal relation may be based on res ipsa loquitur. Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (1944) ; Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 175 (Ct. App. 1963). It is true that causal relation may be based on cir-
cumstantial evidence but it must be found before res ipsa loquitur comes into play on the
issue of negligence. This is graphically illustrated by: Manley v. New York Tel. Co., 303
N.Y. 18, 100 N.E.2d 113 (1951); Seeley v. New York Tel. Co., 281 App. Div. 285, 120
N.Y.S.2d 262 (1953). See also McDougle v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 312 F.2d 21 (4th
Cir. 1963); Cook v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. Ala. 1958) ; Powell v. Moore, 228
Ore. 255, 364 P.2d 1094 (1961); McDonnell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 Vt. 221, 154
A.2d 469, 80 A.L.R.2d 590 (1959).
[VOL. XVIII
1963] SUBMISSION OF ISSUES
courts and by some courts not employed at all.8" As is true of all
circumstantial evidence, the inference based upon a res ipsa loquitur
situation may be weak or strong. 4
It is for the judge to say when a happening rises to the level of res
ipsa loquitur and certain factual data are usually required for that
purpose, but variations are found in these requirements.8 5 Many courts
hold that a res ipsa loquitur situation only raises an inference of negli-
gence which the jury may draw but is not required to draw. 6 Some
situations, however, speak so compellingly of a defendant's negligence
that the defendant must offer explanation or suffer judgment against
him. 7 Also, the happening may speak so conclusively of the defendant's
negligence that the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that he was not negligent.8" While there
33. United States Rubber Co. v. Bauer, 319 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1963); Gerard v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 272 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815
(2d Cir. 1959) ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) (infer-
ence of negligence mandatory; defendant must rebut) ; Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d
88 (1958) (shifts burden of proof to defendant) ; LeFaive v. Asselin, 262 Mich. 443, 247 N.W.
911 (1933) (doctrine rejected) ; Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209 N.W. 835 (1926);
Cole v. Swagler, 308 N.Y. 325, 125 N.E.2d 592 (1955) (not enough to get to jury) ; Sullivan
v. Crabtree, 258 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (varies from case to case, and can no
more be fitted into a fixed formula or reduced to a rigid rule than can the effect of other
cases of circumstantial evidence) ; Chase v. Beard, 55 Wash. 2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959)
(just strong enough to save a non-suit).
34. Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 364 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1963). See also
cases cited at note 33 supra.
35. It is usually required that the happening would not ordinarily occur without the
negligence of someone, that the instrumentality involved was under the exclusive control of
the defendant, that plaintiff did nothing to precipitate the happening and that defendant is
in a position to explain what happened. There is wide leeway for variations in these requisites
and the appellate courts have a hard time in keeping them bound together with any con-
sistency. See James, Proof oj the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur),
37 VA. L. Rav. 179, 194 (1951). See also some interesting notes, 41 N.C.L. REv. 301 (1963) ;
30 TENN. L. Rav. 314 (1963); 14 MERCER L. REv. 427 (1963); 60 MICH. L. REv. 1153
(1962) ; and these cases: United States v. Ridolfi, 318 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1963) ; S. J. Groves
& Sons Co. v. Evans, 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963); Shahinian v. McCormick, 381 P.2d 377,
30 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1963); Whitby v. One-O-One Trailer Rental Co., 191 Kan. 653, 383 P.2d
560 (1963); Bernsden v. Johnson, 174 Kan. 230, 255 P.2d 1033 (1953); Copher v. Barbee,
361 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Renfro v. J. D. Goggins Co., 71 N.M. 310, 378 P.2d
130 (1963); Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961) ; Heyduck v. Elder &
Johnston Co., 187 N.E.2d 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Powell v. Moore, 228 Ore. 255, 364
P.2d 1094 (1961).
36. This attempt to limit the doctrine to the single weight of a permissive inference
stems largely from Sweeny v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913), a malpractice case. This is said to
be the current weight of authority. Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 364 S.W.2d
338 (Ky. 1963) ; Centennial Mills, Inc. v. Benson, 383 P.2d 103 (Ore. 1963).
37. Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1932); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,
42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Sawyer v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 234 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Vernon
v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266, 79 A.L.R.2d 1 (Ky. 1960); Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1380 (1953).
38. Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958); Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86
At. 1007 (1913); See Annot., Res Ipsa Loquitur as Ground for Direction of Verdict in
Favor of Plaintiff, 153 A.L.R. 1134 (1944). See also the dramatic situation (a head-on-colli-
sion of two trains) dealt with in Moore v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 28 Ill. App.
2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1961).
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is little uniformity as to the weight to be given such situations, nearly
all courts in situations in which the inference of negligence is very strong
call the interference a presumption and as a presumption, give it greater
weight.89 But there is little uniformity here either, for the weight to be
given a presumption may only require the defendant to go forward and
offer an explanation which the jury may accept or not, or may impose
upon him the burden to persuade the jury that he was not negligent. 40
Whatever weight is given a res ipsa loquitur situation by the local law,
whether inference, presumption of fact or presumption of law, or other
weight, is a question for the court concerning which he must instruct the
jury. Such an instruction being based on a rule of law avoids the rule of
"no comment" on the weight of the evidence, though in fact, the instruc-
tion does accomplish a weighting of the evidence. The jurisdictions which
do not recognize the doctrine simply treat all such cases as circumstantial
evidence and give their instructions accordingly without violating the "no
comment" restraint. Inasmuch as this restraint was imposed at a time
when legislatures were restricting the power of trial judges at many
points in the litigation process, it is considered to be an arbitrary intrusion
on the judicial process and in most jurisdictions, for all practical purposes
has been eroded out of existence, 4' but not without many hurtful com-
plications in the law governing jury trial.
In many cases, the defendant in meeting the plaintiff's claim of
negligence will offer proof that he was faced with a sudden emergency
not of his own making. He will contend that the emergency was due to
the conduct of someone else or to some combination of circumstances
beyond this control and anticipation, that he was placed under great
stress, that under all the circumstances surrounding his conduct he acted
with the care of a man of ordinary prudence-and that the plaintiff's
injury was the result of an unavoidable accident. These are purely
negative defenses with the burden of proof on the plaintiff to overcome
them by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, if the evidence
reflects facts from which these conclusions can be reasonably drawn-
which is a matter of sufficiency of the evidence to raise the defenses-the
defendant is entitled to have them considered by the jury on the issue of
his negligence. Clearly they are not independent issues entitled to sub-
mission on the same level as the basic issue to which they are relevant.
They concern environmental details incident to the "circumstances sur-
rounding" the defendant's conduct and should be included in the explana-
tory instructions given in connection with that clause of the basic
39. McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions, 13
WASH. L. REV. 185 (1938); Wiehl, Instructing a Jury in Washington, 36 WASH. L. REV. 378
(1961). (On page 394 of Wiehl's article there is shown an instruction taken from CALrFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL, which indicates how complicated instructions on presumptions can
become.)
40. See authorities cited note 39 supra.
41. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
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negligence instruction. In many cases the close and subordinate connection
of these negative defenses to the basic negligence issue is not made clear,
but the defenses are treated as separate issues and frequently submitted
by special instructions. This practice is highly disruptive of the sub-
mission process as is so abundantly shown by the attention given the
defenses by the appellate courts.42
The defense of "sole proximate cause" is also sometimes submitted
as an independent issue. It is a "false" issue on its face, as there can be
no such thing as a sole cause in the sense of causal relation in any case.
Moreover, if used in the sense of causal relation, it is excess baggage, for
if the causal relation question is submitted as suggested above, it is full,
fair and decisive of the cause issue, and "sole cause" as an independent
issue can only be confusing. "Sole cause" is more frequently used in the
sense of fault or wrongdoing as a negative of negligent conduct on the
part of the defendant, or to indicate that some third party was the one at
fault, or that the plaintiff himself was the one whose conduct was
negligent.4 8 These repeated submissions of the negligence issue under
different names are grossly unfair to the plaintiff as well as confusing to a
jury. They serve chiefly as a cross examination of the jury on legal
concepts difficult of understanding even by practitioners and judges.
There may be other important phases of the evidence which should
be made a part of the explanatory instructions following the negligence
issue, such as joint tort-feasors, host and guest, joint enterprise, weather
42. The courts have been greatly plagued by instructions given and refused on the un-
avoidable accident, sudden emergency and kindred negative defenses. While only California
has had the courage to repudiate the unavoidable accident doctrine as an independent issue
deserving special instruction, Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65
A.L.R.2d 1 (1958), there are numerous expressions of disfavor of the issue found in many of
the opinions of other courts, and some courts would restrict instructions within the narrowest
limits. Hart v. Jackson, 142 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963); Sirmons v. Pittman, 138 So.2d
765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) ; Raz v. Mills, 378 P.2d 959 (Ore. 1963). See also Annot., Instruc-
tions on Unavoidable Accident, or the Like, in Motor Vehicle Cases, 65 A.L.R.2d 12 (1959).
Almost every volume of current appellate court reports reflects the struggle the courts
are having with these negative aspects of the negligence issue: "It is interesting here to note
that in the new ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 12.02-.03 (1961), the committee
recommends against giving either 'unavoidable' or 'emergency' instructions."-Wiehl, Instruct-
ing a Jury in Washington, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 378, 383 n.32 (1961). The case that takes the
prize of all cases I have examined for indicating the absurdity of treating the issue as an
independent one, and also for confusing a jury and three courts, is Bradford v. Arhelger, 161
Tex. 427, 340 S.W.2d 772 (1960). The sudden emergency defense and instruction also has its
victims. Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619, 80 A.L.R.2d 1 (Fla. 1959). See also Annot.,
Sudden Emergency in Motor Vehicle Cases, 80 A.L.R.2d 5 (1961).
For an analysis of how the courts may become confused in dealing with negative
defenses as independent issues, see Thode, Eminent Peril and Emergency in Texas, 40 TEXAs
L. REV. 441 (1962). As an example of how complicated the submission process becomes when
these defenses are interposed as independent issues, see Mid-Tex Dev. Co. v. McJunkin, 369
S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
43. Lankford v. Thompson, 354 Mo. 220, 189 S.W.2d 217 (1945); Green, Proximate
Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 471, 480 (1950); 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 281(c) (1950).
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phenomena, conduct of third persons, and the age, blindness, intoxication
or other physical impairment of the plaintiff or the defendant. All may
bear on the issue of negligence or any issue of contributory negligence
that may be raised. But they are not independent issues and do not
deserve submission except as they bear on the basic issues. The recogni-
tion of the litigant's right to special instructions given outside the general
charge on matters incidental to a basic issue-especially binding instruc-
tions-has greatly aggravated the submission practice. Nothing is more
hurtful to the administration of negligence law than the practice of
submitting numerous special instructions requested by the litigants in
addition to the general charge of the court. If a matter is worthy of
instruction it should be given recognition in the appropriate place in the
court's charge in connection with the issue on which it bears. Most of the
matters requested by special instructions are matters that should be
reserved for argument by the advocates in the discussion of the basic
issues.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff's contribution to his own injury is seldom an issue.
Naturally, if there is a situation in which it is doubtful that the plaintiff's
conduct contributed to his injury, the issue should be submitted by the
same causal relation formula and explanation relevant to the issue which
are requisite to the determination of causal relation between the de-
fendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.
It is also seldom that a situation arises in which a plaintiff suffers
injury, that he is not under a duty to protect himself against injury by
the exercise of reasonable care. But it may be that frequently the plain-
tiff's duty does not include the risk of injury incurred by him." If the
extent of the plaintiff's duty is doubtful, that also should be dealt with by
the court-similarly, to the corresponding problem involving the extent
of the defendant's liability.
In most of the situations involving contributory negligence the only
issue is that of the plaintiff's negligent conduct. Many times the con-
tributory negligence issue and what is called an "assumption of risk"
issue are identical or so similar that they do not deserve distinction in
treatment. Perhaps the assumption of risk defenses would best be re-
stricted to a limitation of the defendant's duty and therefore, be wholly
a matter for court determination in that respect.4" Contributory negli-
44. In Manning v. Noa, 345 Mich. 130, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77 A.L.R.2d 955 (1956), gambling
in a bingo game was urged as a defense to the defendant's unsafe premises. The plaintiff's
violation of a gambling act was held no defense to the defendant's duty to an invitee on his
premises. The court's discussion of causation was beside the point.




gence may also be treated as a limitation on a defendant's duty, but only
when the evidence is so clear that the court can rule on it as a matter of
law. In other words, when the judge can invoke either doctrine as
conclusive on the plaintiff, the court is exercising its power to exclude
the injury suffered by the plaintiff as outside the scope of the defendant's
duty. On the other hand, when the court holds that there is evidence that
raises an issue of the plaintiff's conduct as negligent, then the issue is one
of contributory negligence for the jury and should be submitted by the
same formula as employed to submit the affirmative issue of the de-
fendant's negligence. The issue should be submitted in the simplest
terms: Was the plaintiff's conduct (for example, in the operation of his
car) negligent with respect to the injury he suffered? This should be
followed by an explanatory instruction in substance as follows: Should
the plaintiff as an ordinarily prudent person, under all the circumstances
surrounding his conduct, have reasonably foreseen some such injury as he
suffered as a result of his conduct, and did he fail to exercise reasonable
care to avoid such injury to himself? The evidence may require further
explanatory instructions, as are required in submitting the negligence
issue. For example, the plaintiff may account for his conduct by showing
that he was attempting to rescue someone else put in peril by the negligent
conduct of the defendant or that he himself was put in imminent peril by
the conduct of the defendant or someone else from whom he was attempt-
ing to escape. This is the counterpart of the sudden emergency excuse
sometimes offered by the defendant. 46 In most jurisdictions contributory
negligence is an affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the
defendant, but several jurisdictions still require the plaintiff to show
himself free of contributory negligence.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The plaintiff may meet the contributory negligence issue by showing
that the defendant, after he realized (or should have realized) that the
plaintiff was in peril from which he could not, or probably would not,
escape, could by the exercise of reasonable care have avoided injuring the
plaintiff. In some jurisdictions the issue is stated very restrictively, and
in some it is needlessly complicated by causation doctrines.4 7 The doctrine
goes under many names and varies in requirements in different jurisdic-
tions. It is a subordinate issue to the contributory negligence issue. In
46. See cases and materials cited note 42 supra.
47. Elliott v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 643, 53 A.2d 81 (1947); Panarese v.
Union Ry., 261 N.Y. 233, 185 N.E. 84 (1933). Cf. McFall v. Tooke, 308 F.2d 617 (6th Cir.
1962) ; Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. 2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 (1957);
Kumkumian v. City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865 (1953); Palmer v. Murdock,
378 P.2d 271 (Ore. 1963); Dent v. Bellows Falls & S.R. St. Ry., 95 Vt. 523, 116 Atl. 83
(1922).
48. Last clear chance, discovered peril, willful and wanton, humanitarian or Davies v.
Mann are some of the more usual names under which the doctrine is accepted, and each has
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such cases it is usually incontestable that the defendant's conduct con-
tributed substantially to the plaintiff's injury, and also that the defendant
was under a duty to avoid inflicting injury on the plaintiff. The basic
problem is whether the evidence raises an issue of the defendant's negli-
gence in avoiding the injury and this is for the court to determine. If
the issue is raised it is for the court to formulate the issue for submission
in conformity with local law. The doctrine is sometimes thought to require
antecedent negligence on the part of the defendant, but this is not true
and the doctrine is available as a defense to the plaintiff's contributory
negligence conduct without reference to any prior negligence of the
defendant.49 It is based on the same policies as the original negligence
action and only differs from it by the time sequence following the negligent
conduct of the plaintiff. Its function is to modify the harshness of the
contributory negligence doctrine and usually is reflected in the reduction
in damages awarded by the jury.
DAMAGES
There are many rules for evaluating the items of loss suffered by a
plaintiff as the result of his injury, and the subject is too large for
discussion here. The evaluation of the items in nearly all instances is a
function of the jury in light of the instructions on the measures to be
employed. The only matter of emphasis made here-and its importance
is frequently overlooked-is that every item of loss for which the plaintiff
may recover must be found by the court to fall within the scope of the
defendant's duty with respect to the risk of injury imposed on the plaintiff.
It is rare indeed for a plaintiff to recover damages for his full losses. He
may suffer losses far beyond the scope of protection of the law and these
must be excluded from the items of injury for which he may recover
damages. Thus it is that the duty issue is so very important in the
litigation process in negligence actions, and is exclusively within the
control of the court. 50
CONCLUSION
This suggestion for the modification of current submission methods
is based in great degree on the modern:, English practice before the
English courts abandoned jury trials in negligence cases. Many members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations utilize the practice with
its own refinements. One of the better statements of the doctrine is found in James v. Keene,
133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961), Comment, Last Clear Chance in Florida, 17 U. MIAME L. REV.
582 (1963); Nichols v. Spokane Sand & Gravel Co., 379 P.2d 1000 (Wash. 1963) (Washington
version).
49. Palmer v. Murdock, 378 P.2d 271 (Ore. 1963); Ford v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry.,
151 Tex. 538, 252 S.W.2d 561 (1952). Cf. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Ford, 166 Va. 619,
186 S.E. 85 (1936).
50. The damage issue is considered with some fullness by the writer in RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE ch. 6 (1927).
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variations. It is designed to retain the chief virtues of the general charge
and general verdict and of the special issue practice, making interrog-
atories unnecessary and avoiding special instructions. In many cases
there would not be in excess of four or five issues at the most to be
submitted with such explanations as would be relevant to each. Each issue
with its explanatory instructions would be framed so that the jury after
consideration could answer the issue "yes" or "no," yet the jury would
be required to render a general verdict on the whole case for the plaintiff
or the defendant. The answer of any issue favorably to the defendant
would vitiate a general verdict found for the plaintiff. Since the separate
issues would indicate how the answers of the jury would affect the out-
come of the case, there would probably be few findings of particular
issues in conflict with the general verdict. This is as it should be. The
idea of blindfolding the jury as to the significance of its verdict, or to the
issues that support its verdict, is a complete repudiation of jury trial in
its historic sense, and the courts that have attempted to so control jury
verdicts have paid dearly in abortive trials and in miscarriages of justice. 1
Whose responsibility is it to develop a rational submission practice?
Clearly the standard instructions prepared by committees of the bar are
not the answer. Such efforts have usually wound up in refined and
multitudinous forms wholly unsuited for purposes of informing a jury and
more generally designed to give a footing for review by appellate courts
if either given or refused. In whatever direction one may look the wild
growth of instructions has rendered the submission process all but
incomprehensible. Perhaps the best hope for the development of a rational
submission practice lies in the rule making and decisional power of the
appellate courts with such assistance as they may receive from practi-
tioners who have no axe to grind. Needless to say, however successful
their efforts might be, they would have to guard against the strangulation
of the process made by the refinements insisted upon by practitioners.
They would have to guard even more zealously against the refinements
made by the courts themselves.52 Doing justice by jury trial can never be
more than approximate, and no more effective way can be designed for
destroying its usefulness than by the over elaboration of the submission
process.
51. See materials cited note 5 supra.
52. Mills v. Charles Roberts Air Conditioning Appliances, 93 Ariz. 176, 379 P.2d 455
(1963). Instructions on the negligence issue as reflected in this case require more of jury
trial than it can respond to. Considerations such as here submitted for jury determination
are well enough for judges with respect to the scope of duties and for the arguments of
advocates, but as instructions on the law they say too much.
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